Out of the blue?
1. ''This was a vicious and cynical attack out of the blue in a way that there was no knowledge of beforehand in any respect whatsoever."
Source: Home Secretary Charles Clarke, 8th July 2005 on the London bombings of 7 July 2005
2. '' We have been told in evidence that none of the individuals involved in the 7 July group had been identified ( that is, named and listed) as potential terrorist threats prior to July''.
Source: Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005 , published 11 May 2006 ( hereafter referred to as the ''ISC report'')
3. The definition of an ''essential target'' for investigation ( from the ISC report)...
''Essential - a target who is likely to be directly involved in, or have knowledge of, plans for terrorist activity, or an individual who may have knowledge of terrorist activity''
''Targets move between investigative tiers as new information of activities and intentions is received and priorities are regularly reviewed to ensure that resources are appropriately allocated''
( Source: ISC report sec. 23 and 34, page 8)
4. ''It has become clear that Siddeque Khan was the subject of reporting of which the Security Service was aware prior to July 2005. However his true identity was not revealed in this reporting and it was only after the 7 July attacks that the Security Service was able to identify Khan as the subject of the reports.
''Prior to the 7 July attacks, the Security Service had come across Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer on the peripheries of other surveillance and investigative operations. At that time their identities were unknown to the security service and there was no appreciation of their subsequent significance. As there were more pressing priorities at the time, including the need to disrupt known plans to attack the UK (see Dhiren Barot case - RN) it was decided not to investigate them further or seek to identify them. When resources became available, attempts were made to find out more about these two, and other peripheral contacts, but these resources were soon diverted back to what were considered to be higher investigative priorities ''
(Source: Government's Response to the Intelligence and Securities Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks of 7 July 2005, published May 2006.) ( PDF)
5. ''Documents recovered from the scenes of the attacks on 7 July gave an indication of the possible identities of the four men involved. Once these were confirmed, the Security Service and other Agencies initiated reviews of their records to establish whether they had come across any of the individuals before 7 July, whether they had any prior intelligence of the attacks or whether the attacks made the meaning of any existing intelligence clearer''
( Source: ISC report sec. 41 page 13 )
6. ''Having reviewed its records once details of the bombers came to light, the Security Service did find, however, that it had come across two members of the 7 July group on the peripheries of other investigations. These were Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer.''
( Source: ISC report sec. 45 page 14)
7. ''The director-general of the security service MI5 told senior MPs there was no imminent terrorist threat to London or the rest of the country less than 24 hours before the July 7 suicide bombings.
Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller gave the assurance at a private meeting of Labour whips at the Commons on the morning of July 6 2005, the Guardian has learned from a number of those present.
The whips are said to have been confident, on leaving the meeting, that they could brief fellow MPs that the security situation was under control, and are said to have been deeply alarmed by the following day's events''
( Source: Guardian January 9th 2007 'MI5 told MPs on eve of 7/7: no imminent terror threat')
8. ''The fact that there were suicide attacks in the UK on 7 July was clearly unexpected: the Director General of the Security Service said it was a surprise that the first big attack in the UK in ten years was a suicide attack.''
( Source: ISC report sec. 102 page 28)
9. Operation Kratos: is the code word used by theSO13 (Anti Terrorism branch) branch of London's Metropolitan Police Service to refer to policies surrounding and including "shoot-to-kill" tactics to be used in dealing with suspected terrorists and suicide bombers. The tactics were developed shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks, and are claimed to be based in part on consultation with Israeli and Sri Lankan law enforcement agencies on how to deal with "deadly and determined" attackers
( Source: Wikipedia on Operation Kratos)
More as soon as I can...and for clarity, I'll be blogging all this, not publishing it in a book that isn't out until the summer.